



# **Bulgaria**

# Baa1 stable/BBB stable/BBB positive\*


#### Outlook

The stronger-than-expected pace of economic recovery so far this year triggered an upward revision to our GDP growth forecast for 2021. With Bulgarians set to head to the polls in July for a second time this year, the outlook is for a fragmented parliament with large support for the populist parties backing last year's protests. Under the most likely scenario, the populist parties, ITN and IMV, will join forces with the right-wing DB to form a minority government, which will rely on the parliamentary support of the BSP. We remain of the view that the economic policy of the new government will not deviate significantly from the path pursued by the GERB over the past four years. The main downside risk to our favorable baseline scenario is related to another COVID-19 wave during the winter months.


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# KEY DATES/EVENTS 11 July – parliamentary elections 23 July – rating update from Fitch 17 Aug, 07 Sep: 2Q21 GDP (flash, structure)

#### **GDP GROWTH FORECAST**



#### **INFLATION FORECAST**



Source: National Statistical Institute, UniCredit Research

#### **MACROECONOMIC DATA AND FORECASTS**

| MACROECOROMIC DATA AND FORESACIO    |       |       |       |       |        |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
|                                     | 2018  | 2019  | 2020  | 2021F | 2022F  |
| GDP (EUR bn)                        | 56.1  | 61.2  | 60.6  | 65.6  | 70.5   |
| Population (mn)                     | 7.0   | 7.0   | 6.9   | 6.9   | 6.8    |
| GDP per capita (EUR)                | 8 016 | 8 809 | 8 768 | 9 544 | 10 333 |
| Real economy, change (%)            |       |       |       |       |        |
| GDP                                 | 3.1   | 3.7   | -4.2  | 4.4   | 4.1    |
| Private consumption                 | 4.4   | 5.5   | 0.2   | 3.5   | 3.1    |
| Fixed investment                    | 5.4   | 4.5   | -5.1  | 3.8   | 9.6    |
| Public consumption                  | 5.4   | 2.0   | 7.5   | 3.9   | 1.7    |
| Exports                             | 1.7   | 3.9   | -11.3 | 7.2   | 7.5    |
| Imports                             | 5.7   | 5.2   | -6.6  | 6.1   | 7.5    |
| Monthly wage, nominal (EUR)         | 586   | 648   | 709   | 776   | 841    |
| Real wage, change (%)               | 7.7   | 7.5   | 7.7   | 6.8   | 6.1    |
| Unemployment rate (%)               | 5.2   | 4.2   | 5.1   | 5.2   | 4.1    |
| Fiscal accounts (% of GDP)          |       |       |       |       |        |
| Budget balance                      | 2.0   | 2.1   | -3.4  | -5.5  | -2.8   |
| Primary balance                     | 2.7   | 2.7   | -3.0  | -5.1  | -2.4   |
| Public debt                         | 21.8  | 19.7  | 24.4  | 26.7  | 27.4   |
| External accounts                   |       |       |       |       |        |
| Current account balance (EUR bn)    | 0.5   | 1.1   | -0.4  | 0.6   | 1.6    |
| Current account balance/GDP (%)     | 0.9   | 1.8   | -0.7  | 1.0   | 2.3    |
| Extended basic balance/GDP (%)      | 3.2   | 4.8   | 3.9   | 5.4   | 7.7    |
| Net FDI (% of GDP)                  | 1.3   | 1.9   | 3.2   | 2.2   | 2.6    |
| Gross foreign debt (% of GDP)       | 61.5  | 57.6  | 63.4  | 61.0  | 59.3   |
| FX reserves (EUR bn)                | 25.1  | 24.8  | 30.8  | 32.8  | 36.3   |
| Months of imports, goods & services | 8.0   | 7.4   | 10.4  | 9.8   | 9.8    |
| Inflation/monetary/FX               |       |       |       |       |        |
| CPI (pavg)                          | 2.8   | 3.1   | 1.7   | 2.6   | 2.3    |
| CPI (eop)                           | 2.7   | 3.8   | 0.1   | 3.4   | 2.3    |
| Central-bank reference rate (eop)   | -0.50 | -0.61 | -0.70 | -0.63 | -0.55  |
| USD/BGN (eop)                       | 1.71  | 1.74  | 1.60  | 1.60  | 1.56   |
| EUR/BGN (eop)                       | 1.96  | 1.96  | 1.96  | 1.96  | 1.96   |
| USD/BGN (pavg)                      | 1.66  | 1.75  | 1.71  | 1.62  | 1.58   |
| EUR/BGN (pavg)                      | 1.96  | 1.96  | 1.96  | 1.96  | 1.96   |

 $Source: Bulgarian\ National\ Bank,\ Eurostat,\ National\ Statistical\ Institute,\ UniCredit\ Research$ 

<sup>\*</sup>long-term foreign-currency credit ratings as provided by Moody's, S&P and Fitch, respectively

June 2021



Solid growth in 1Q21 triggered an upward revision to our 2021 growth forecast

Economic activity improved in 1Q21...

...at the cost of letting COVID-19 infections spread unchecked

The US treasury imposed sanctions on three local citizens...

...just six weeks before the next parliamentary election

The parties that benefited the most from the protest against GERB are likely to form the next government

# A V-shaped recovery is on track, but downside risks are up

We have significantly raised our real GDP growth forecast for 2021 to 4.4% (from 2.6%). This mostly reflects the stronger-than-expected recovery so far this year, as Bulgarian authorities decided to keep the economy as open as possible during the second and third wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Our growth forecast for 2022 is now changed to 4.1% (from 4.4%). We now see output recovering to its pre-pandemic level in 4Q21. A decline in the unemployment rate close to the level associated with full employment is now anticipated toward mid-2022.

Less-stringent restrictions and poor compliance contributed to GDP growth surprising on the positive side in 1Q21. The solid growth of activity indicators in April underlined that a strong recovery continued at the start of 2Q21. With most high-frequency indicators in April already above their pre-pandemic level (left chart below), the overall picture is one of an economy that is on track for a V-shaped recovery. However, Bulgaria paid a heavy price for the solid pace of GDP growth in 4Q20 and in 1Q21. While the country was not affected as badly by the first wave of the corona virus pandemic, the early relaxation of restrictions caused the number of deaths to rise sharply during the second and the third wave (right chart below).


Just one month before the next election, the US imposed sanctions on three local citizens using the Magnitsky Act. The sanctions seem to target two murky business figures and local oligarchs - Vassil Bozhkov and Delyan Peevski. The former was sanctioned for "using bribery to create a channel for Russian political leaders to influence Bulgarian government officials", while the latter was sanctioned for "using influence peddling and bribes to protect himself from public scrutiny and exert control over key institutions and sectors in Bulgarian society". On balance, the US sanctions are likely to have a positive impact, as they should add to the pressure on local politicians to press ahead with their anticorruption efforts. Importantly, they will undermine the chances of Mr. Bozhkov's party, Bulgarian Summer (BS), to enter the next parliament. Several public opinion polls showed that prior to the announcement of the US sanctions, BS, the political creation of Mr. Bozhkov, looked likely to surpass the 4% threshold required for entry into parliament on 11 July, after gaining 3.1% of the vote in April.

With Bulgarians set to head to the polls in July for a second time this year, the outlook is for a fragmented parliament with large support for the populist parties backing last year's protests. Recent opinion polls show that GERB is likely to remain the largest party in parliament, but GERB is in isolation and its chances to form a government are slim. Under the most likely scenario, the populist parties, ITN and IMV, will join forces with the right-wing DB to form a minority government, which will rely on the parliamentary support of the BSP.

The risk of some form of fiscal populism is limited. Across-the-board increases in public sector

# MOST ACTIVITY INDICATORS ARE ABOVE PRE-PANDEMIC LEVEL

# BULGARIA PAID A HEAVY PRICE FOR THE SOLID GDP GROWTH



Source: Worldometer, National Statistical Institute, UniCredit Research

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Across-the-board increases in public sector wages are likely to be replaced by a more selective approach

wages pursued by GERB over the past four years are likely to be replaced by a more selective approach, where the focus will be on sectors (such as education and health care) that are key to boosting the country's competitiveness. The reasons for this policy change are partly ideological, as the DB are the staunchest supporters of the small government doctrine and want to see public sector wage increases scaled down, and partly more pragmatic, as higher public sector spending pursued by GERB has exhausted some of the free fiscal space available prior to the pandemic. In addition, the pandemic-linked temporary increase in pensions (amounting to 0.8% of GDP annually) by the GERB, is likely to be made permanent by the new government, which would further squeeze any free fiscal space left unused after two hard years of unprecedented fiscal stimulus to support the pandemic-hit economy.

Minimum wages will lose in importance as a tool to support income convergence Only small (if any) increases in minimum wages are likely if the DB dominate the economic policy making of the new government. Such shift seems disappointing to us. We regard minimum wages as one of the very few instruments available to the government to impact income levels. If used wisely, minimum wages can support income convergence and help to bring down to more sustainable levels the already elevated income inequality in the country.

No major changes in taxation anticipated

Under the most likely scenario, there would be no major changes in taxation. The BSP would have to abandon its plan to remove the regressive taxation of personal income, as no support for such move is likely to come from the right-wing DB, which made preserving a flat income tax its priority. The DB's plan for a reduction of small companies' taxation would also have limited chances to materialize, at least in the short-run, as the immediate priority of the new coalition government would be to demonstrate that it can sustain fiscal prudence, despite the alleged lack of sufficient expertise of some of its founding members.

Introduction of tax-free allowance on personal income looks likely

The only tax amendment we expect is the introduction of a tax-free allowance on personal income. This is because all parties likely to be represented in the next parliament, apart from GERB, have voiced support for such a move. While there is no clarity as to the size of the allowance and whether it will apply to all earners or only to the poor, we regard this tax change as growth-positive, since it should help those at the bottom of the income distribution.

The main downside risk to our baseline scenario is related to another wave of COVID-19

The risk of another wave of COVID -19 in the winter is significant

infections in the winter, as only 13% of the population has been vaccinated as of mid-June (left chart below). It is particularly worrisome that the amount of people willing to get the vaccine is much lower than what is needed to achieve herd immunity (right chart below), according to recent polls. We think urgent efforts are needed by the government and private sector to increase vaccination rates. The leaders in politics, business and art should organize and hold a large-scale campaign aimed at making widely available all relevant information regarding the

May'21)


Boosting vaccination rates should be the upmost priority


vaccine (15 June 2021)

# URGENT EFFORTS ARE NEEDED TO ACCELERATE VACCINATION Share of the total population that have received at least one dose of COVID-19

pros and cons of vaccination.

## RISK OF ANOTHER PANDEMIC WAVE IS LARGE





Intention to get vaccinated in EU countries (as % of population over 18 years,

Source: Worldometer, Eurofound, UniCredit Research

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June 2021

**CEE Macro & Strategy Research** 

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